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What Shall We Do in Case of War? • Friedrich Engels

EVERYBODY knows what war means today. It will be Russia and France on one side; Germany, Austria, and possibly Italy, on the other. Whether they are willing or unwilling, the socialists of all countries will be obliged to fight against each other. What will the German socialist party do in that case? What will become of it?

2. The German Empire is a monarchy with semi-feudal forms but dominated, in the final analysis, by the economic interests of the bourgeoisie. Thanks to Bismarck, the Empire has committed bad mistakes. Its vexatious, police-agent's, narrow domestic policy, unworthy of the government of a great nation, has earned for Germany the contempt of all liberal bourgeois countries. Its foreign policy, on the other hand, has provoked the distrust, if not the hate, of its neighbors. Reconciliation with France has been made possible for a long time as a result of the violent annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. Without gaining for Germany any real advantage, such a foreign policy has managed to make Russia the arbiter of Europe. That is so evident that immediately after Sedan, the Council General of the International could predict the present situation in Europe. In its address of the 9th of September 1870, the Council declared:

3. "Do the Teuton patriots really believe they will assure liberty and peace by throwing France into the arms of Russia? If Germany, carried away by the good fortune of her arms, by the arrogance of victory and dynastic intrigue, commits the territorial despoiling of France, either of the following things will result. She will either openly become the tool of the Russian policy of conquest, or, after a short armistice, will have to face the prospect of a new defensive war, which, unlike the modern 'localized' war, will be a war against the united Slav and Latin races."

4. There is no question that over against the German Empire, The French Republic, such as it is, represents revolution—the bourgeois revolution, it is true—but still revolution.

5. But the matter is no longer the same when that Republic places itself at the orders of Russian Tsarism. Russian Tsarism is the enemy of all the Western peoples, even of the bourgeois of these peoples. The Tsarist hordes, invading Germany, will bring slavery instead of liberty, destruction in place of development, reaction in place of progress. Moving arm in arm with the Tsar, France cannot bring Germany any liberating idea. The French general who talked to Germans of a Republic would provoke the laughter of Europe and America. The war will amount to the abdication of the revolutionary role of France. It will permit the Bismarckian empire to pose as the representative of occidental progress against Eastern barbarism.

6. But behind official Germany, is the German socialist party—the party to which belongs the future, the immediate future, of the country. As soon as the party arrives to power, it will not be able to exercise that power, or maintain its rule, without correcting the injustices toward other nationalities committed by its predecessors. It will have to prepare the restoration of Poland, so shamelessly betrayed today by the French bourgeoisie. It will have to appeal to North-Schleswig and Alsace-Lorraine to determine freely their political future.

7. All these questions will solve themselves without effort in the near future, if Germany is left alone. Between a socialist France and Germany there can be no Alsace-Lorraine question. The matter will be adjusted in an eye-wink. We must wait another ten years. The proletariat of France, England and Germany waits for its emancipation. Can not the patriots of Alsace-Lorraine also wait a while? Is theirs an issue over which a continent may be devastated and, finally, subjected to the Tsarist knout? Is the game worth the candle?

8. In the case of war, first Germany, then France, will be the principal stage. These two countries will pay the cost in the form of devastation. More, the war will from its start be marked by a series of betrayals among the allies, unequalled in the annals of the diplomacy. France or Germany, or both, will be the principal victims. It is therefore certain that neither of these countries—in view of the risks they run—will provoke open hostilities. Russia, however—sheltered as it is by its geographic position and economic situation against the very baleful consequences of a series of defeats—official Russia alone can find it worth while to provoke such a terrible war. And it is she who will lead to it. At any rate, we wager ten to one that at the first cannon roar on the Vistla, the French armies will march on the Rhine.

9. Then Germany will fight for its very existence. For even if victorious, it will have nothing to annex.

10. On the East as well as on the West it will find only provinces speaking foreign languages. Germany already has too many of them. Beaten, crushed between the French hammer and the Russian anvil, it will have to cede old Prussia and the Polish provinces to Russia, Schleswig to Denmark and the entire left bank of the Rhine to France. Even should France refuse, its ally will impose this conquest on it. What Russia needs above all is a permanent cause of enmity between France and Germany. Reconcile these two great countries, and Russian supremacy in Europe comes to an end. Dismembered in the described manner, Germany will be incapable of fulfilling her part in the European civilizing mission. Reduced to the role imposed on her by Napoleon after Tilsit, it will live only to prepare a new war of national rehabilitation. But in the meantime, it will be the humble instrument of the Tsar, who will not fail to use it—against France.

11. In view of this, what will become of the German socialist party? It goes without saying that neither the Tsar nor the French bourgeois republicans, nor the German government itself, will let pass such a good opportunity to crush the party, which all of them recognize as an enemy. We have seen how Thiers and Bismarck clasped hands over the ruins of the Paris Commune. We can therefore expect to see the Tsar, Constans, Caprivi (or whatever successors they may have) to embrace over the corpse of German socialism.

12. But the Germany socialist party, thanks to the uninterrupted efforts and sacrifices of the last thirty years, has won for itself a position that is not occupied by any of the other socialist parties: a position assuring it of political power, upon the maturing of a brief delay. Socialist Germany occupies in the international workers' movement the most advanced, the most honorable, the most responsible post. It has the duty of holding this post in spite of, and against, everybody.

13. Now if the victory of the Russians over Germany signifies the crushing of the socialist movement in that country, what is the duty of the German socialists in face of this event—

ality? Shall they passively endure the events that threaten them with extinction, abandoning without resistance the post they have won, and for which they are responsible to the world proletariat?

14. Obviously no. In the interest of the European revolution, it is up to the German socialists to defend all the positions they have gained, and not to capitulate either before the foreign or the domestic enemy. And they will be able to accomplish that only by giving relentless battle to Russia and its allies, no matter who and what are those allies. If the French Republic puts itself at the service of His Majesty the Tsar and Autocrat of All Russias, the German socialists ought to combat France also. As opposed to the German Empire, the French Republic may represent the bourgeois revolution. But contrasted to the Republic of the Constans, the Rouviers and even the Clemenceau — the Republic that works for the Russian Tsar — German socialism represents the proletarian revolution.

15. A war in which Russians and Frenchmen invade Germany will be to Germany a war for life or death, in which, in order to assure its national existence, it will have to resort to the most revolutionary means. The present government will, it is understood, not set in motion the revolution, at least unless it is forced to do so. But there is a strong party which will force the government to do so, or, if necessary, will replace it. That is the socialist party.

16. We have not forgotten the great example France gave us in 1793. The centenary of '93 is approaching. If the Tsar's thirst for conquest, and the chauvinist impatience of the French bourgeoisie, stop the victorious, but peaceful, march of the German socialists, you may rest assured they will be ready to demonstrate that the German proletarians of today are not unworthy of the French sans-culottes of 100 years ago and that 1893 is as good as 1793. And when the soldiers of Constans put their feet on German soil, they will be greeted with the song of:

*Quoi! ces cohortes étrangères
Feraient la loi dans nos foyers!
(What! Will these foreign cohorts
Rule in our homes!)*

Translated by INTEGER

REVOLUTIONARY RECIPES FOR WAR

• Integer

THE ARTICLE reproduced above was written by Engels in 1892, two decades before the war he foresaw burst out — much in the manner he predicted. Twenty years after the last shot of the World War, the powers are preparing for another trial of arms.

In 1892, the lineup was: "Russia and France on one side; Germany, Austria, and perhaps Italy, on the other." Engels knew that willy-nilly "the socialists of all countries would be obliged to fight against each other." He counselled the German laborites to fight for their country, even under the orders of the semi-feudal monarchy. He gave the following reasons for such a stand:

1. It was essential to defend Germany from Russian Tsarism, which threatened all Western peoples with slavery, destruction and regression.

2. It was essential to assure the "national existence" of the German fatherland.

3. It was essential to preserve the German labor movement, occupying "the most advanced, the most honorable, the most responsible post" in the international labor movement. This post could only be held by backing the Kaiser's imperial apparatus to victory over backward Russia and bourgeois France. If necessary to attain this victory, the German laborites were to take over governmental power, continuing the war as a war for "national existence," or if defeated, for "national rehabilitation."

The fine arguments put by Engels in print in 1892 were used, by the heads of the Party to which he gave this advice, for the purpose of mustering the German workers to fight for the fatherland in 1914. But we must be careful not to let creep in the belief that the official Social Democrats of Germany (and other countries) reached out to Engels' line of thinking when they were overwhelmed by the explosion of August 4th. In fact, they had always held to this plan of action. It was Engels' position on war that was presented and adopted in the form of the "Kautsky resolution" at the International Socialist Congress in 1900. Even his enthusiasm over the possibility of the Labor Party's becoming the government of the country (because the Kaiser's government could not carry on a successful war against the Russians and Frenchmen, for that required "revolutionary" means)—even this idea is reproduced by Kautsky in 1909 when he touches on the probable war between Germany and France:

"It may happen that in the weaker of the two warring countries the effort to unite all the forces of the State against the external enemy may bring the most daring and energetic class—the proletariat—to the head of the nation." (*The Road to Power*, page 36, German ed.)

If the experience of 1914-1918 proved anything it is the hollowness and irreality of Engels' and his imitators' war plans for the workers of Germany and the world. The war did make the German Labor Party the government of the country—though not to continue the war by "revolutionary means" in defence of the national existence of Germany against reactionary Russia and bourgeois France, but to sign a peace which there is no doubt, Engels (like Hitler and Ludendorff) would have branded as an ignominy. Another Party (it, too, calling itself "Socialist" and "Labor") used this issue of an ignominious peace to kick out the party of Engels and Kautsky, to become the government and to set afoot most thorough preparations for a new World War, a war that will be fought by the Germans under the Engelsian slogan of "national rehabilitation," of the "preservation of national existence." By liquidating regional differences within the country, by completing the political and cultural unification of Germany begun in 1800, and through the nationalization and State control of industry and commerce—using all the "revolutionary" means involved in Engels' strategy of the national war-revolution—Hitler's "National Socialist Labor Party" is now marshalling the forces of Germany for the new international slaughter. History laughs raucously over the paragraphs of Engels' historic strategy.

It was the privilege of the elderly, and possible senile, associate of Marx to play anagrams with letters he made stand for masses and classes. The game affected somewhat differently the "quantity," the human "material," juggled in that revolutionary general's calculations.

In the last World War, the British, French and American propertyless were implored by the Keir Hardies, the Vaillants and Cachins, by American progressives like the editors of the New Republic and the Nation, by many advanced and far seeing proponents of social progress to give up their lives in a war to preserve democracy from the rapacity of militaristic Kaiserism.

At the same time, the German workers were called on by the German continuators of Engels' strategy to save the "most advanced, most honorable, most responsible post of the international labor movement" from the brutal paws of barbarous, backward Russia. What did the workers get because they followed the advice of these fine lovers of liberty, democracy and progress? Did they get liberty? Was the world made safe for democracy? Where is the social transformation which the good guides were going to bring us into by having as many workers as possible put on soldiers' uniforms, take up guns and kill enthusiastically—in behalf of democracy, liberty, civilization, and the strategy of social progress—similarly-recruited workers of other countries? The game always affects differently the millions of working propertyless that these guides presume to show the way.

The matter is especially different for socialist workers, who have learned all the sound things the Engelses and Kautskys have to teach them and have come to recognize that these useful teachers, though they speak of socialism, half belong to the past, to the era of the bourgeois revolution, where "vanguard" minorities, revolutionary generals, acting self-consciously, knowingly, lead and give orders to a mass that participates in the revolutionary act in an unwitting, brute fashion—without understanding its aims, without considering its methods.

Engels discloses himself when he puts an equals sign between the German Social Democracy and the proletarian revolution. We can see now that the German Social Democracy of 1892 no more stood for the proletarian revolution, for the socialist transformation of society, than the German Social Democratic Party in 1914 or 1932; than the National Socialist Labor Party of Germany (Nazis), the British Labor Party or the C.P.S.U., today. Like all other *Labor* and "progressive" parties then and today, the German Social Democracy was the political expression of the desire of the propertyless and small-propertyed of capitalist society to better their condition within the framework of capitalism. It was not composed of socialists—men and women understanding the aim, socialism. Like other organizations using the term "socialist" and "socialism," it was a party of capitalist social reform.

It is so easy and natural for the engrossed masters of capitalist politics to impute their own purposes and strategy to the pawns they presume to wield. Engels and other great social scientists who have helped to recognize the workings of capitalist society were essentially bourgeois social scientists, though they wanted and worked for the destruction of capitalism. In them, the outlook typical of the socialist revolution wrestled with the bourgeois revolutionist's way of seeing things.

"The centenary of '93 is approaching . . . And then the soldiers of Constans (he forgets that these soldiers of Constans are but conscripted French workers and peasants) will be greeted when they step on *German* soil with the song of:

"What! Will these foreign cohorts rule our homes!"

Similarly: "Britons never, never, never shall be slaves!"; and "Oh, say does that star-spangled banner yet wave o'er the land of the free and the home of the brave?"

Old age often melts into childhood. Engels in his senility slipped back to the bourgeois Jacobinism of 1793.

READ

WHAT SHALL WE DO IN THE NEXT WAR?

In the next issue of the
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW

WE ARE FACED today with a new world war. We know what it will mean. We had a taste of something like it twenty years ago. But this one will be a better World War, more advanced, more scientific. Both the metallic machinery and the publicity of the next war is sure to surpass by far the last one. For how more scaresome is the "Fascist menace" than the threat of "Prussian militarism!" And how more convincing than the Kaiser's wail about a "place in the sun" must seem to many Germans Hitler's demand for a "fuller life and opportunities of development to a united German people."

Somewhat as in Engels' time, the probable lineup will be Russia, France and Great Britain (and maybe the United States) on one side; and Germany, certain parts of the former Austrian Empire, Italy, and Japan on the other.

The Laborite and Liberal recruiting sergeants can still find inspiration in Engels' essay of 1892. ("France, although bourgeois and imperialist, is the country in Europe that presents, together with Republican Spain, the most considerable development of the world labor movement. German and Italian Fascism holds over the labor movement the menace of extermination comparable to that which in 1892 emanated from Russian Tsarism." *Drapeau Rouge*, No. 15, 1937). Then we have today a "Socialist fatherland."

The experience of the last war for democracy and civilization seemed to have taught to thinking workers that:

"There is only one safe rule for the working class to follow when urged by the capitalists to support capitalist wars. No matter what form the appeal may take, they should examine the question in the light of working class interests. Ask yourself the question: 'Have the working class of one nation any interest in slaughtering (and, being slaughtered by) the workers of another?' 'Have they any material interest in gaining victory or avoiding defeat, in defending frontiers or fighting for national independence?' 'Have they any interest in supporting one national section of the capitalist world against another?'"²

In view of the menace of brutal Fascism and Nazism, the rape of China by Japan, the altercation between Negrin and Franco, the advances made by the Popular Front in France, the peace-loving of Delbos and Chamberlain, Stalin's painstaking construction of a most interesting kind of socialism over a sixth of the globe's surface—in view of all of that, is the answer "No!" to these questions?

HOPE and FEAR in SPAIN

• Peter Xandu

AFTER THE statement by Roberto of the suspicion that a possible way out of the Spanish mixup sought by some

Powers was a truce between the Salamanca and Valencia-Barcelona government and the possible creation of a Spanish "Ireland," the talk of the advisability of an armistice is beginning to creep into the publicity sent out of the foreign offices of Europe. And the world "Irelandia" is even being rolled in a number of Spanish speaking government bureau.

It is quite possible that Paris and London will decide to take the fate of Loyalist Spain out of Russia's hands.

That will inevitably spell a slump for the C.P.S., which, being as much a pocket party as Franco is a pocket generalissimo, and

¹An anti Stalinist "Revolutionary Marxist" publication in Paris.

²From *War and the Working Class*, published by the Socialist Party of Great Britain, 42 Great Dover St., London, S.E. 1, Price 10 cents.

was blown up for an occasion that may be beginning to pass away. Communist Parties invariably get tripped up by the howling contradictions of their program when they are left to their own resources. They become big and important when they have some big and important work to do in the direct service of the USSR.

1. The Spanish Communist Party has done a perfect job. (Its history and rise are described in the February and April issues of the *International Review*, 1936.) It has neutralized and defeated all attempts by the Spanish radicals to meddle with the existing social order and thus endanger the Laval-Stalin pact. By manipulating the "revolutionary" prestige of the Soviet Union and the Russian Revolution, it has isolated the nervous P.O.U.M., driving it underground. Similarly the damper was put on the more important syndicalist Federation of Labor, the C.N.T. The latter has found it necessary to pay homage to the "Proletarian Fatherland" so as not to alienate the solidarity of its own membership.

2. The Communist Party of Spain has been successful (in conjunction with the Azaña and Prieto Republican-Social Democrat caucus) in bringing back the old military bureaucracy to the command of the loyalist forces. The anti-fascist militia committees never held complete power in Loyalist Spain—not even during the most "revolutionary" months of the rebellion. Furthermore, all labor organizations (especially the P.O.U.M.) wanted an organized army and a unified command. But they wanted to keep this command under the control of the labor organizations. What the C.P.S. proposed and succeeded in getting was a traditionally functioning army, under the more or less undisputed control of the old military professionals, who, like Miaja and most of his staff, were members of the Spanish Military Union, in other words cronies of the professionals who command the other (so-called Fascist) side. These are the people who have handed over Toledo, Malaga and Santander to Franco, going over to his side when they found this necessary. These are the people who the Communists thought they could be sure of. The Miajas and Rojos will, however, always do the necessary thing. Then beware, commissars who get in the way! This juncture is possibly not far off.

3. The C.P.S. has organized politically and in "trade unions" the petty-bourgeois and the remnants of the big bourgeoisie in Loyalist Spain. It has sucked in the traditional officialdom, the local *caciques* (political bosses), the Federation of the Catholic Youth, the civil guards and the old police. It quickened all these elements to the "radical" danger. They recognized that there was protection, power, salaries for them under the wing of the Communist Party. They recognized that the Communist Party was an effective political shield and weapon against the radicals, who appeared to have come to the top on July 19, 1936. The interests of the small and big bourgeoisie, of the governmental mandarin, of all the people who had something to lose if the radicals' wild or sound schemes were even partly applied—the interests of these people were best represented by the C.P.S. The Spanish Communist Party grew very big while the traditional political organizations of the bourgeois became small. The Spanish bourgeoisie in the Loyalist territory was overwhelmed on July 19. They have recovered their spirit and confidence under the shelter of the C.P.S., which gave it class expression. A working arrangement between a Spanish Free State and a Spanish Ulster will not be a very difficult attainment after a few more adjustments like the following:

The News Agency España, directed by the Stalinists, informs the world: "We have reestablished the worship of our faith,

after the decision taken by the government of the Republic and notably by Sr. Don Jesus Hernández, the Minister of Public Instruction." Hernández is also a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Spain.

4. The C.P.S. has succeeded in thwarting and making ludicrous all attempts of the radical workers and peasants to improve their condition by their own economic enterprise. Such attempts were primarily inspired by the disorganization of the economic process in the Spanish cities. While these measures did not threaten capitalism as such, they did threaten directly the property and interests of certain sections of the native bourgeoisie and, of course, of the foreign investors. For some time all industrial property that the trade unions tried to run for the workers had been called "war industry" by the Stalinist officials in charge of the State Department of Industry and taken over by the State to be held for the rightful owners till the emergency has passed. It was also inevitable that poor peasants should grab land when the old police was not around (after July 19) to protect the landlords. The Ministers of Agriculture (all have managed to be Communists) have refused to legalize in most cases the possession of land acquired by the peasants through such expropriation.

5. The C.P.S. has sacrificed the chances of republican victory to its desire to keep the politics of Loyalist Spain safe for Stalin. The tendency to guerrilla warfare belongs to Spain and the Spaniards. It spread over the country when the regular forces were marched into rebellion by their commanders. Guerrillas could have offered a decisive complement to an organized, regular Republican army. But the Communist commissars and the professional militarists in their confidence did not trust the existing of guerrillas. They were afraid that such units might help the radicals' purposes. The guerrilla movement was systematically suppressed. There was left a stiffly moving "regular" army, with elaborate salutes, the traditional social disparity between officers and ranks and very little enthusiasm.

Santander, Bilbao and the Asturias would have no doubt been saved from Franco if Largo Caballero had succeeded in relieving the North and Northwest by realizing the proposed Merida operation. But the Communists wanted to discredit Caballero at any cost. Caballero was found to be unsafe for them. Alvarez del Vayo was sent to him with the suggestion to enter the Communist International. This was to remain unknown to the membership of the S.P.S. at first; just as Alvarez' membership has remained secret. When disclosed, at the opportune time, Caballero's adherence to the C.I. was going to work deep repercussions in France. But Caballero refused to join the Stalinist Foreign Legion. Caballero was tied hand and foot, then kicked out of the government. Against his consent, the partnership of Miaja, Prieto and the Stalinist cabal sent 10,000 anti-fascist fighters to a sure death at Brunete. Caballero the "inactive" had left the Ministry of War.

Peña and Menéndez managed to hold back the investment of Oviedo by the Asturian miners and to assure the Asturian defeat—because their two wives were in that city and might have been imperilled. The loss of the Asturias wrote finis on the Loyalists' hope of victory.

6. The C.P.S. has demoralized the bravest and most idealistic elements of the anti-fascist defense with a sordid delirium of "plots," kidnappings and assassinations. Imported G.P.U. agents combined with the native Stalinist police (many of them with Primo de Rivera training) in order to make Spain safe for Stalin's idea. The word "Cheka" came to be applied in Spain

to the private prisons run by the Stalinists for the benefit of radicals.

It is funny. Facse light up at the suggestion that the "democratic" big Powers might take a hand in Loyalist Spain themselves, instead of continuing to have things managed there for them by the Soviet agencies, as up to now. The possibility of disagreement between Azaña-Prieto and the Communists cheers even the people who would otherwise rush to combat the proposal of a truce.

But lo! The latest "terrorist plot" against Camorera, proved by the documents provided by the Political Bureau of the C.P. was dismissed by the court as non-existent and the dozen P.O.-U.M. charged with it liberated. Only a short while ago the Chief of Police Burillo closed down the *Solidaridad Obrera* because it refused to print the Stalinist version of the plot. What does this mean?

ONCE AGAIN: Kronstadt and Workers Opposition • Victor Serge

From "Révolution Proletarienne," Paris

COMMENTING in its turn on Leon Trotsky's letter (in answer to Wendelin Thomas' inquiry about the identity of Stalinism and Bolshevism—or Leninism-Bolshevism, as the loyal followers of the Old Pretender to the Soviet throne like to put it, Ed) . . . *La Lutte Ouvrière*, (official Trotskyist organ in France) poses the issue so lop-sidedly that it succeeds in completely evading it.

To see Trotsky's commentary as a note, dashed off in a hurry, is to treat history in a cavalier manner and reduce the labor of analysis and reflection that is incumbent on us to apology, which is far removed from Marxist thought.

La Lutte Ouvrière writes:

"The only question to which it is useful to reply is: 'Has a revolution, victorious, although undermined by social and economic contradictions of civil war, the right to smash movements whose being spells the beginning of the parties of capitalist democracy?'"

This is obviously not the only question. The entire history of Bolshevism and the Soviets is at issue here. And posed that way, the question becomes exactly the opposite of the question which revolutionists, with the most legitimate anxiety, ask themselves about Kronstadt: 'Did the dictatorship of the proletariat, as exercised by the Communist Party, have the right to crush by violence the protests, demands, proposals and demonstrations of workers in the prey of famine? We recall that before Kronstadt there was Astrakhan. Was it right for the dictatorship to suppress movements which proceeded only from workers' democracy? I am inclined to believe that quite early there was full-fisted abuse—that is, recourse to administrative and military methods against the masses and dissidents in the revolution. Experience has shown us that this cuts a road to bureaucratic despotism. There is a lesson to be drawn here, a lesson arguing for a sincere return to the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat (a dictatorship against the dispossessed possessors) in the form of a broad and genuine democracy of workers.

La Lutte Ouvrière "moreover takes the occasion to destroy the legend which makes out Kronstadt 1921 to have been a vast massacre. The truth is otherwise . . ."

You say the truth is otherwise, comrades? Very well, then tell us the truth, give precise information. indicate your sources . . . A massacre need not be vast to be repulsive and—by definition—anti-socialist. But what is the truth here? By hundreds, by thousands, the Kronstadt sailors were shot on the spot. And three months later, more were still being taken out of the Petrograd prisons in small batches to be executed in the prison cellars and yards. Three months later, after the official proclamation of the Nep, which the sailors had asked for, when their death—their secret death—could not even serve the purpose of intimidation! And they were not Whites . . .

Everything on this sombre page appeared to sketch a future that is our present. *La Lutte Ouvrière* recalls that the Xth Congress of the Communist Party sent large numbers of its delegates to storm Kronstadt. But the *L.O.* does not tell everything. The Xth Congress had just solemnly condemned the Workers' Opposition, which denounced the encroachments of the bureaucracy and demanded more democracy for the workers. For the first time, an opposition—which was substantially correct on several points (as Lenin and Trotsky were to see two years later)—was branded with an epithet that did not in the least correspond to its theory (the resolution of the Congress charged these Bolsheviks with anarcho-syndicalism), threatened with expulsion and punished with the dispatch of its delegates to the Kronstadt front . . .

Reread the platform of the Workers' Opposition and recall that eighteen months later, Lenin, almost at the end of his resources, proposed to Trotsky a bloc to struggle against the Party bureaucracy, which was becoming ever more insolent. Consider that two years later, the Left Opposition (Trotsky, Preobrajensky, Serebriakov, Piatakov, Rakovski) struck its first blow and was beaten. It was already too late.

Two of the authors of the platform of the Workers' Opposition, Shliapnikov and Medvedev, old militants for a quarter of a century, imprisoned for years, are perhaps still alive, in some forgotten jail. Alexandra Kollontai survives in the diplomatic career.

MORE ON BOLSHEVISM-LENINISM • J. A.

VICTOR SERGE, a Communist intellectual who now survives in the career of leftist, anti-Stalinist, *belles lettres*, commiserates with the workers and sailors butchered at Kronstadt. But at the same time, he manages to smuggle in the suggestion that perhaps Lenin and Trotsky only made a mistake and really had better intentions. Did not Lenin, only "18 months later," propose a united front with Trotsky against the ever more insolent Party bureaucracy?

We fear that Serge, too, "reduces the labor of analysis and reflection that is incumbent on us, to apology, which is far removed from Marxist thought"—if by Marxist thought Serge does not mean the system of theology and social romantics that is dishied as Marxism by the various heirs of the Russian Revolution.

There is no doubt that the dying Lenin felt that his heritage of power was being snatched up while he still lay on his sick bed, even before he had attained Godhood through pharaonic embalment. There is no doubt that Trotsky and his set of bureaucrats took up the issue of "Party democracy" as soon as

they saw themselves bettered by their rival bureaucrats. But did not Zinoviev and Kamenev do the same when they, the "bureaucratic" victors over Trotsky and the first "left opposition," were in turn beaten by their former Stalinist allies? For Serge, the historic fortunes of the Soviet State combine into a drama of great personalities: some good, who at times make mistakes and later pay for their mistakes; others, villainous personalities, who by taking advantage of the upright heroes' errors, turn the flux of history into an evil course. Marxist thought, indeed! Marx would hold his sides from great laughter at such Marxism.

Did Lenin make a mistake when he declared in 1921: "Mensheviks and Social-revolutionaries, disguised as non-party people or avowed—we shall put them in prison." Did he slip again in 1922 when he corrected this to: "Machine-guns must take care of the people who call themselves Mensheviks and Social-revolutionaries?"

Did Lenin make a mistake when he said in 1922 ("18 months later," when, according to Serge, he conceived with L.T. his bloc against the bureaucracy): "*We admit neither liberty, nor equality, nor worker democracy, if such things oppose the interest of the emancipation of labor?*" And what did Lenin mean by "the interest of the emancipation of labor?" He explained clearly what he meant: "*Production is necessary always, democracy only sometimes!*" Doesn't the aphorism ring like the wisdom of another revolutionary, another builder of socialism, *Partei-genosse* (party comrade) Goering, now doing his best as the supreme supervisor of Hitler's "emancipation of labor?"

Tell me what is common between the frank stand of the Workers' Opposition (representing the Russian Workers' interests and therefore brutally suppressed by Lenin, Trotsky and the other powerful *Partei-genossen*) and the involved hypocrisy of the politician who, when he proposed the militarization of the Russian workers in 1921-22, tried to push aside opposition to his militarization scheme with the following quibbling:

"The militarization of labor is a procedure in the manner of Arakcheiev (Tsarist official) when it strikes against the opposition of the workers. It is a procedure typical of the socialist dictatorship by the will of the workers themselves."

And how could the will of the workers express itself? Certainly not through the democratically elected representative bodies (Soviets) for the asking of which the Kronstadt sailors were butchered by the thousands on March 18 and in "small batches" for three months after. Certainly not through the opposition of the workers against such militarization. For when workers show opposition to the will of their militarizing "emancipators," they automatically become counter-revolutionaries and cannot be considered to be workers' opposition.

No, brother Serge! The system of political thought and behavior you call Stalinism did not appear full-blown in 1923 when father Lenin breathed his last and Trotsky supposedly muffed his chance to carry on old Lenin's good work by going hunting partridges in the country. And it is not the result of excusable, if reprehensible, slips of two great revolutionary heroes: Lenin and Trotsky, who by such mere carelessness as the butchery of the Kronstadt sailors and the imprisonment of worker oppositionists, played into the hands of bad Stalin.

In 1918—out of her prison—Rosa Luxemburg attacked Bolshevism as Bolshevism in these words:

"The remedy invented by Lenin and Trotsky, the suppression of democracy in general, is worse than the ailment it is supposed to cure."

In opposition to the program and method of Bolshevism, the typically Russian instrument of history for the *capitalist emanci-*

pation of the huge, anachronistically backward country of two decades ago, she presented the program and method of the socialist (proletarian) revolution:

"It is the historic mission of the proletariat when it arrives in power to create in place of bourgeois democracy a socialist democracy and not destroy democracy."

And now, for the benefit of the tens of tender souls who have written to the International Review that the story of Kronstadt as described in our last issue cannot be true, because "they have been in the movement for many years" and have always "heard that the Kronstadt sailors were counter-revolutionaries," and "the Revolution had to be saved" and "anyhow there weren't so many sailors killed," and "revolutionary workers did the killing, in the defence of a menace to the emancipation of the workers and peasants"—for the benefit of these revolutionists, we reproduce Souvarine's account of the Kronstadt affair (*Staline, Plon*; the author gives a long list of sources and references; he was close enough to the Communist International in 1921 to know what happened).

Our quotation follows this brief summary of two preceding paragraphs:

General strike in Petrograd. Communist Party authorities make numerous arrests, suppressing street demonstrations. The sailors and garrison at Kronstadt hold a huge meeting in sympathy with the Petrograd workers. At this meeting, Kalinin is received with music and flags. (The whiskered gentleman played his usual role; he has never failed to show up to play "uncle" for the Bolshevik masters at public gatherings.) The Kronstadt meeting votes its resolutions (see previous issue of International Review). A deputation is sent to the Communist Party authorities in Petrograd. The delegates are put under arrest by Zinoviev, the Communist governor of the North-East (Petrograd) district. The Kronstadt sailors and soldiers then elect a provisional committee. The Bolshevik Councils of Labor and Defence proclaim a state of "counter-revolution" and martial law in Petrograd. *Trotsky orders the bombardment of Kronstadt.* And now in Souvarine's own words:

"If the sailors and workers of Kronstadt had really plotted a revolt or devised a plan of action, they would have waited till the thaw, which would have rendered their fortress impregnable and left Petrograd at the mercy of the cannons of the fleet. But they hoped to gain their demands by the power of the justness of their cause and through the solidarity of the laboring population of Russia. There is no question either of their political candor or their loyalty to the revolution. However, the heavy 'apparatus' of the Bolshevik Party was no longer sensitive to the purity of the best intentions.

"Attacked over the ice by the *kursanti* (military cadets; student officers), the rebels defended themselves, becoming insurgents in spite of themselves. The Red Army, sent against the forts, refused to march. It was therefore necessary to purge the ranks (you understand how this is done—*ed.*), surrounding and working on them by means of Communist reinforcements that arrived from the Xth Congress. By the sinister irony of history, the Kronstadt Commune perished on the 18th of March, on the day of the 50th anniversary of the Paris Commune."

Souvarine ends the sad story with two short sentences:

"One does not glory in some victories. To the Kronstadt affair, Trotsky has devoted exactly two lines in his book of memoirs."

The rewriting of the history of the Russian Revolution did not begin in 1924. The falsifications are not all by Stalin.

These are the people who presume to speak of the emancipation of the proletariat, of socialism.

One of the obstacles rising in the way of our emancipation, one of the obstacles has to be conquered for the propertyless of the earth to become aware of their historic task and the strength of their numbers, is the influence exerted by the Stalins and Trotskys.

BRITISH POLITICS: 1938

• F. A. Ridley

Author of: *The Green Machine, At the Cross-Roads of History, Mussolini Over Africa, Next Year's War, Julian The Apostate and The Rise of Christianity, The Papacy and Fascism, The Jesuits—A Study in Counter-Revolution (in the press.)*

THE POLITICAL scene in Great Britain is to-day cloudy and confused. One looks in vain for highlights, for clear landmarks, for dramatic moves, for outstanding figures. Britain to-day is waiting on world events. The supreme parasite of modern Imperialist development, she remains the classic example of the defensive in world politics. What she has, she intends to hold. The tortuous, but fundamentally consistent policy pursued in recent years by the "National" Government under the political direction of Baldwin-Eden-Chamberlain, depends for its successful continuance upon the maintenance of an internal political and social balance.

"In a later article I will strive to analyze the forces external to Great Britain which dominate in the last resort her internal position, and to whose unseen but potent and ever-present "pull" her internal situation reacts instinctively. Here, it is British political Institutions and Parties that must be examined in broad perspective. Accordingly, I enumerate the political forces at work in Britain, moving in due sequence from "Right" to "Left." (The differential grades are, for the most part, infinitesimal, and the terms are used in a "British" i.e. a peculiar—sense.) (I begin with the "Right.")

I. THE MONARCHY

The British Monarchy may be defined broadly as the reserve army of British Capital. It is, of course, the external link which binds together "Our" Empire, and its social prestige in Britain, the most snobbish country in the world, where class distinctions are carried even into public houses!—is still enormous. The crown is, in fact, the "Vesuvius" of British politics. That is, it is a silent volcano which, none the less, exudes its warning column of smoke as an ever-present sign that it could resume activity at any moment. It might have become the immediately decisive factor in British politics in 1931, when only the "opportunism" of Ramsay MacDonald prevented an "unthinkable" event—viz. the turning-out of a properly elected "democratic" government by "unconstitutional" action. Under Edward VIII, a potential dictator who failed to arrive, the crown threatened to become a "party of one," and to resume the political tradition of George III, which ended summarily when Cornwallis surrendered to Washington at Yorktown. As a Tory politician expressed it privately to a friend of the writer—"We had to get rid of Edward by hook or by crook. Mrs. Simpson was the hook."

To-day the monarchy is shaken and submissive. The amiable nonentity who is now "ruler" of Great Britain, will faithfully

fulfill the constitutional role of the British Monarchy, i.e., he will only act when his colleague "King Capital" requires him to do so. The ignominious fall of the most popular King who has reigned in England since Elizabeth, demonstrates the iron strength of the British financial and landed oligarchy, and of its political instrument, the Conservative Party. British Capital has the "Constitution" in its pocket. It juggles like a master with its component elements. For example, in 1931, it overthrew the Labour Party with the aid of the King; in 1936, it overthrew the King with the aid of the Labour Party.

2. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY

Ever since its transformation by the political genius of Disraeli, the outstanding political master of the 19th Century, the Conservative Party has been the trusted standard-bearer of British finance-capital, the guardian of the Empire—and, needless to say of its exploiters. Trotsky has aptly characterized the British people as the most conservative in the world, (so conservative, in fact, that revolution can be preached with impunity in Hyde Park and at street-corners. It can never happen while "human nature"—in this instance, British Capitalist Imperialism—retains its present material and ideological strength. Hence, England is "the freest country in the world. That is, British Capital is too strong to fear revolution.)

None the less, British Conservatism is not at all conservative with regard to its own past. The semi-feudal, semi-Jacobite Party, which in the 18th Century believed, before Bolingbroke, in the Divine Right of Kings, which in the 19th Century lagged so far in the rear of "progress" (Capitalism) that even Karl Marx believed in its proximate extinction has now become the most up-to-date Party of Imperialism, the City of London, and the financial oligarchy. The Tory Party—for its 17th Century name still sticks—is, in fact, an historical mosaic. In its fabric are interwoven landed property; feudal and even pre-feudal ceremonial; the Anglican Church and its "spiritual" culture hero, the Vicar of Bray, ably represented by the present Archbishop of Canterbury; the House of Lords, not to mention the "Colonel Blimps" of the London Service Clubs.

But the above are really relics retained by the innate conservatism of the British people. By and large, the Conservative Party is a Party of up-to-date opportunists, as flexible in its means as it is flexible in its ends. It will use impartially State Capitalism or private Capitalism, fascist methods or democratic ones, to retain its unchanging ends. These latter may be defined as follows: a. The retention of the British Empire. b. The retention of what is left of British Capital's 19th Century pre-eminence in international trade and finance. c. The retention of the rule of the British Oligarchy at home, a rule which has subsisted unaltered since Cromwell and the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688, albeit increasingly camouflaged under democratic forms. (That the grip of the British Oligarchy on the State machine is as firm as ever despite "universal suffrage," can be deduced from two significant facts: the overthrow of the vastly popular Edward the VIII, overnight as it were; and the interesting fact that, since the Lloyd George-War era, the British ruling class has not required the services of a demagogue wherewith to bluff the masses. Anything less like one than the humdrum business man who is now its political director, or his predecessor, "the bluff Worcestershire squire," could not conceivably be imagined.)

That the Tory Party is flexible enough to act as the instrument of British Capitalism under any condition is indicated by

the extreme variety of its composition. It contains Tory "Planners," (Liberal Fascists) a la H. G. Wells) like Major Elliot and Captain Harold Macmillan, diehard political "fundamentalists" like Mr. Amery and Colonel Gretton, brilliant men like Winston Churchill, and "Backwoodsmen," to whom brains are abhorrent, like the average peer. But fundamentally, the Tory Party is a party in which individuals count for little. It will never assimilate another genius like Disraeli, whom it accepted only as the alternative to destruction. Its one really great politician of recent times, Stanley Baldwin, had to make a special cult of denying that he had any brains worth speaking about! British Conservatism represents the formula for the rule of British Capital, from now on until the masses wake up to the absurdity of a permanent regime of poverty in the midst of plenty, i.e., until the extinction of Capitalism and of class rule in Britain.

3. "NATIONAL LIBERAL" AND "NATIONAL LABOUR GROUPS"

In themselves insignificant, but useful in that they hide the nakedly Conservative character of the "National" Government, i.e. they preserve the "National" illusion, and reserve, consequently, a seat on the bandwagon for the Labour Party, if and when war-time exigencies compel the creation of a government of "National Unity." Otherwise a fig-leaf to hide the nakedness of Ramsay MacDonald, and a godsend for aspiring politicians, such as Hope-Belisha, the ("National-Liberal") Minister of War.

4. BRITISH UNION OF FASCISTS

Politically, the B.U.F. represents nothing much more than a curiosity, a collection of male marionettes in coloured shirts. It represents neither the interests nor the ideology of British Capitalism. The veiled dictatorship of British Capital is far too effective to afford scope for the suggestion that the substitution of an open Fascist dictatorship would be in any way advantageous to the status quo, even supposing that the British masses, accustomed to the delusive atmosphere of "freedom" inculcated by Capitalist "democracy" could be induced to accept the change without "heavy civil war," which would react disastrously, independently of its results, on Britain's international prestige and credits. (Moreover, if Britain went Fascist, she would lose her master-slogan for securing "the moral unity of the nation" in a way for "democracy," against the rival Imperialisms of Germany and Italy, which happens to be Fascist.)

British Fascism is merely the personal following of an ambitious and disgruntled adventurer, Sir Oswald Mosley, a would-be dictator who has never studied the technique of dictatorship and the situations in which it "arrives." If the interests of British Capitalism require the transformation of a veiled into an open dictatorship—i.e. "democracy" into Fascism—the Conservative Party is willing to fulfill the required role, and it has already "extraordinary powers" lying ready to hand. As a Socialist writer (Dr. E. Conze) recently aptly remarked: "Fascism is always the result of a broken working-class revolution."

tion." In Britain to-day a revolutionary situation is not even remotely in sight. Ergo: Fascism in the Mosley-Continental sense is a pure irrelevance in contemporary British politics. Consequently, the state of "anti-fascist" activity on the Left merely affords an indication of its woeful superficiality, and the consequent inability of its pseudo-theoreticians, the Strachays, Coles, Laskis, Rudlins, etc. to understand and, consequently, analyze the concrete contemporary situation of British Capitalism. Mosley is merely a smoke-screen for the activities of the "National" Government, the potential source of any genuine Fascism in the future in Great Britain. The British ruling class is at present both too strong and too conservative for Fascism.

The above constitutes a brief enumeration of the principal political forces of a "right"—openly capitalist—character which dominate the contemporary political scene in Britain. We now turn to the "Left" forces which claim the support of the workers and the "advanced" sections of British society.

JAPANESE RADICAL ON CHINA WAR

• E. K.

1. When the fighting began near Peiping last July, the Japanese government hastened to inform the world that its military activity had one purpose—to wipe out "red" influence. The latter was said to be chiefly responsible for the anti-Japanese feeling of the Chinese people. The sophistry of this claim is apparent to any body who is acquainted with the recent course of Sino-Japanese relations. The fact is that the Japanese State wanted to soften this way the alarm of British capital over its investments in China, which were evidently in danger. It was important to neutralize British opinion, to hold Britain to a spectator's role during the clash. Friction with Great Britain was going to be reduced to a minimum by appealing to a sentiment that is very strong among the British conservatives, who had before shown their willingness to keep on good terms with Japan if she challenged the USSR in the Far East.

2. Britain is the European power that has the largest stake in China. The traditional influence of British capital in China has grown of late as a result of its tie-up with the Kuomintang, the political representative of the rising Chinese bourgeoisie.

China has been undergoing a rapid process of national unification, essential for the capitalist development of the country. The power and authority of the central government was considerably consolidated with the recent adoption of a reformed monetary system, by which Chinese money entered the bloc of the pound sterling (and the gold-exchange standard). The new system centralized the issue of bank-notes in the hands of the central government. It made the local authorities financially dependent on Nanking, thus stripping them of their semi-independent status and undermining the economic basis of the surviving feudal order in China.

What rendered possible the success of this bold step was the credit and assistance given to Nanking by British capital, which naturally backed the Kuomintang for the sake of its own interests. Behind the increased authority of the Chinese central government were the British. Japan preferred to see China remain divided. And it could not move against Nanking without expecting a direct repercussion in London.

3. In so far as they opposed the unification program of the Chinese nationalists, the USSR and its agents, the Comintern,

Is fascism "the result of a broken working-class revolution?" The International Review disagrees with the typical stand of "socialist theorists" like Konze and others. Read special article: *What Is Fascism?* in the next issue of the

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW

have had a disintegrating influence on China. Outer Mongolia became a "Soviet" republic long before Manchukuo was conjured up. Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) is virtually a protectorate of Russia; Chinese suzerainty over this region is now less than nominal. It is true that the Chinese communists have played a part in fomenting an anti-Japanese spirit in the population of China. On the other hand, the "red" army in the Soviet districts has been a disconcerting *bête noir* for Chiang Kai-Shek. The modernization of the Chinese Army, under the guidance of German and Italian military experts, was much more important for bolstering up the courage of the Chinese for a contest with Japan than all the propaganda conducted by the Communists. The part played by the Comintern in the "national awakening" of China is not as great as it is reputed to be.

4. To repeat, what gives modern capitalist China a specially significant place in the international arena is the understanding reached between the Kuomintang and the British capitalists. When Nanking adopted its new money system, it chose to become the Far Eastern outpost of Great Britain opposing Japanese expansion in the world market.

But there were ample reasons why Japan should have avoided a frontal clash with Britain over China. The most important of these were: (1) the possibility of a rapprochement between the British and the U.S.A., bringing a common front of the two powers against Japan in the Pacific sphere; (2) Japan's anxiety over the augmented military strength of the USSR in the Far East. In view of these factors, the Japanese government sought the path of compromise. At its initiative, negotiations were begun in London (on the occasion of the recent coronation). The aim of the talks was to determine the respective spheres of Japan and Great Britain in China.

5. It was natural for Nanking to regard these negotiations with suspicion. China wanted the London talks to fail. Neither was the USSR interested in their successful conclusion. A British-Japanese understanding in China can only be consummated at the expense of the Russian position in the Far East.

The London talks were discontinued as soon as the guns began to roar in the vicinity of Peiping. It was senseless for British capital to negotiate while Japanese military action endangered its investments.

It is in the light of this delicate international situation that we ought to consider Japan's claim that it is conducting a holy war against Communism in China. The same holds true for the anti-Communist pact with Germany. Whatever the Japanese government may aver about the nature and purpose of the present war, it remains true that the war aims a mortal blow against British influence in the Far East. The life-line of Britain in the Far East passes through Nanking.

6. In other words, the present Sino-Japanese conflict is at bottom a struggle between Japan and Great Britain over the resources and markets of China. The role of the awakened nationalism of the Chinese is important, but fundamentally its importance is that of an instrument.

This peculiarity of the situation is best grasped by the USSR. That is why the Soviet government offers an anti-war treaty to Nanking and assumes the attitude of being ready to give full support to China in the present fight—while, at the same time, its Ambassador Slavutsky assures Tokyo that Russia has no intention of intervening in China against Japan.

7. As a result of continued repressive measures by the government, there exists no Communist movement in Japan in the shape of an official party. (Japanese anarcho-syndicalism was thoroughly suppressed out of existence.) But we should not therefore con-

clude that the Comintern has no influence in Japan. Owing to the tradition of the October revolution, the Communist influence is deeply rooted in the ideological consciousness of the Japanese proletariat. The best selling socialist literature is always that written by Russian authors and translated from Russian. Stalin is almost a demi-god in the eyes of the Japanese labor leaders. Once, on the floor of the Parliament, the Japanese labor deputies did not hesitate to exclaim that they considered the Soviet Union as their fatherland. Yet the Social Masses Party, the third strongest party in parliament (with 37 seats), rushed to approve unconditionally the war measures now taken by the Japanese government in China. Its example was followed by the Proletarian Party (commanded by such prominent communists as K. Arahata and M. Suzuki); its single member in Parliament, K. Kato, cast his vote for war credits with the rest. Many Communists demanded to be enrolled into the armed forces and sent to the front. The most striking instance of such patriotic enthusiasm is offered by the action of Professor Sano and his Comrade Nabeyama, respectively the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the executive committee of the dissolved Communist Party of Japan. Both petitioned the authorities, from the prison cells where they were serving terms of life imprisonment, to be permitted to enter the army for active service at the front. It is quite clear why, with such guides, there has been no anti-war gesture by Japanese labor.

8. In spite of the declaration by the Comintern in favor of a "People's Front" against Japanese imperialism, it is evident that the USSR and the C.I. are pursuing a double and reversed policy in Japan and China. While China is made to expect effective help from the USSR, Japan is advised (as noted above) to be at ease against the possibility of Soviet intervention in China. At the same time, the followers of the Comintern in England are preaching to the British workers that their unemployment is caused by Japanese competition.

9. That the present conflict is really a war born out of the antagonisms and rivalry of the Japanese and British capitalisms, will become apparent as the fighting progresses. The enormous sacrifices and heavy burdens incurred by the Chinese people in this war are after all an obligation imposed on them by British capitalism and its ally. The British are calling on the Chinese people to demonstrate the maximum of sacrifice in the name of national salvation . . . Yet it is probable that when the endurance of the Chinese people is exhausted, Britain will not hesitate to abandon them to their fate. It will then turn to Japan with an offer to reopen the interrupted London conference, in order to save the remaining British interests in China.

MARX and PARIS COMMUNE

• Martov

(The first reader is advised to see the preceding essay in *International Review*, no. 7, vol. 2.)

WHEN HE considered the Commune in his writings, Marx could not merely present his views on the dictatorship of the proletariat. The uprising had many enemies. The first thing to be done was to defend the Commune against their calumny. It was natural for this circumstance to influence Marx's manner of dealing with the slogans and ideas of the movement that made March 1871.

Because the revolutionary explosion which led to the seizure

of Paris by the armed people on March 18, 1871, was the expression of a fierce class struggle, it also provoked a conflict between the democratic-republican population of the large city and the conservative population of the provinces, especially that of the rural districts.

During the preceding two decades, the "backward" peasantry of France helped to crush revolutionary and republican Paris by supporting the extreme bureaucratic centralism of the Second Empire. As a result of this, the revolt of the Parisian democracy against the national representatives sitting at Versailles, appeared at first to be a struggle for *municipal autonomy*.¹

This circumstance gained for the Commune the sympathy of many bourgeois radicals, people who were for administrative decentralization and wide local autonomy. For some time, this aspect of the Paris Commune of 1871 hid the real nature and historic meaning of their movement even from the most outstanding Communards.

In his book of recollections of the International, the anarchist Guillaume tells how immediately after the outbreak of the revolt, the Jura Federation sent their delegate Jacquault to Paris, in order to find out what would be the best way of helping the uprising, which the Jurassians considered to be the beginning of a universal social revolution. Great was the surprise of the men of Jura when their delegate returned with a report of the total lack of understanding shown by E. Varlin, the most influential of the "left" militants among the French internationalists. According to Varlin, it appears, the uprising had a purely local aim—the conquest of municipal liberties for Paris. According to Varlin, the conquest of these liberties was not expected to have any social and revolutionary repercussions in the rest of Europe (*L'Internationale, Souvenirs*, vol. II, page 133.)

It is understood that this could be said only during the first days of the Commune. Soon the historic scope of their revolution started to become visible to the Paris proletariat. It is nevertheless true that the Commune never completely freed itself from the bourgeois conceptions that wanted to limit its aims to questions of municipal autonomy.

It is this lack of *ideological* clarity in the Communards' minds that Marx later attacked in a letter to Kugelmann. In this letter, Marx mentions a demonstration staged against him by the Commune refugees in London, and takes the occasion to recall that it was he, however, who had "saved the honor" of the revolution of 1871. Marx "saved the honor" of the Commune when he revealed its historic meaning, a meaning that the Commune combatants were not aware of.

But the Commune was influenced by other ideologies besides that of bourgeois radicalism. It also bore the imprint of Anarchist Proudhonism and Hebertian Blanquism, the two tendencies that fused in the general French working class movement. The representatives of these currents of thought sought in the Paris Commune a content that was diametrically opposed to that which the democratic bourgeoisie wanted to put in it. The semblance of identity between the social revolutionary and the bourgeois radical viewpoints was only due to the fact that both took a common stand against the bureaucratic and centralizing leanings of the State apparatus left by the Second Empire.

During the last few years before the Commune, the French Blanquists managed to make some contact with the working people of their country. They partially passed beyond the bourgeois Jacobinism under whose influence (and the influence of

the Baboeuf school) they grew up. While they did not cease to draw their political inspiration from the heritage of the 18th century revolution, the most active representative of Blanquism became more circumspect in regard to the Jacobin forms of democracy and revolutionary dictatorship. They tried to find for the proletarian movement of their time an ideological support in the revolutionary tradition of the "Hébertists," the extreme left of the *sans-culotte* of the French Revolution.

In 1793-1794, Hebert and his partisans found support among the real *sans-culotte* of the Parisian faubourgs, whose vague social and revolutionary hopes they tried to interpret. By means of this support, the Hebertists strove to turn the Paris Commune into an instrument by which they might exert pressure on the central government. Making use of the direct help of the armed populace, the Hebertists wanted to transform the Paris Commune of 1794 into a center possessing total revolutionary power. As long as Robespierre had not as yet reduced it to the level of a subordinate administrative mechanism (and he did that by crushing the Hebertists and sending their chiefs to the guillotine), the Commune of 1794 really represented the active revolutionary elements among the Parisian *sans-culotte*, by whom it had been chosen. Up to then, it incarnated the instinctive desire of the masses of the city poor to impose their dictatorship on rural and provincial France with its backward political conceptions.² Page Six and Seven Footnotes Please return copy.

The Commune, as the instrument of the revolutionary will and the direct revolutionary action of the propertyless masses, as contrasted to the democratic State, became the political ideal of the young Blanquists of the latter years of the Second Empire.³

In the course of the Revolution of March 18, another political trend, that of the Anarcho-Proudhonians, became visible. It acted alongside the "Hebertian" current, at times mingling with it.

Both tendencies saw in the "commune" a lever of revolution. But to the Proudhonians, the commune did not appear to be a political, and specifically revolutionary, organization that, pitted against the just as political, and more or less democratic, State, was to obtain the effective submission of the latter by means of the dictatorship of Paris over France. They opposed every form of the State as an "artificial" — that is, political — grouping, established on the basis of the subordination of the citizenry to

²It is to the Communes of Paris and Lyon that belongs the credit of initiating the extreme acts of political terror (September executions, the expulsion of the Girondins from the Convention) and the measures of "consumers' communism" by which the cities, deprived of resources, attempted to force the petty bourgeoisie of the villages and the distant provinces to provide them with foodstuffs. It is in the Communes of Paris and Lyon from where the expeditions of the "army of revictualing" started. There were organized the "committees of poor," for the purpose of appropriating grain from the contemporary "kulacks," whom the jargon of the period called "aristocrats." The two Communes of the French Revolution imposed contributions on the bourgeois and "took charge" of the stocks of commodities produced by industry during the preceding years (especially at Lyon). From these organizations emanated the requisition of residences, the forcible attempts to lodge the poor in houses considered to be too large for their occupants, and other equalitarian measures. If in their quest for historic analogies, Lenin, Trotsky and Radek had shown a greater knowledge of the past, they would not have tried to tie the genealogy of the Soviets to the Commune of 1871 but to the Paris Commune of 1793-94, which was a center of revolutionary energy and power very similar to the institution of their own time.

³In his letter to Marx, July 6, 1869, (*Correspondence*, vol. IV, page 175), Engels mentions Tridon's pamphlet, *Les Hébertistes*, in which the author presents the arguments of that wing of Blanquism:

"It is ridiculous to suppose that the dictatorship of Paris over a France—the rock on which the first revolution was wrecked—can simply be reproduced and meet with a different fate."

¹"The 18th of March took the aspect of a rebellion of Paris against provincial oppression," writes Paul Louis, the historian of French socialism. *Histoire du socialisme français*, 2nd ed., page 308.

an apparatus, even under the fallacious guise of popular representation. The "commune" they had in mind was the "natural" social organization of producers.

According to their outlook, the commune was not merely to rise *above* the State, or subject the latter to its dictatorship. It was also to *separate* itself from the State, and invite all the 36,000 *communes* (cities and villages) of France to proceed the same way, thus decomposing the State and substituting for it a free federation of communes.

"What does Paris want?" asked *La Commune* on April 19, and it answered its own question, as follows:

"The extension of the absolute autonomy of the Commune to all the localities of France, assuring to each its rights, to every Frenchman the complete exercise of his faculties and aptitudes as a human being, citizen and worker.

"The autonomy of the Commune will be limited to the right of equal autonomy of all the communes participating in the pact. Such an association will assure French unity."

Logically flowing from this stand was a *federalist* program in the Proudhon-Bakunist spirit, which recognized a voluntary and elastic pact as the only tie between the communes and excluded the complicated apparatus of a general State administration. The Communards were quite pleased when they were nicknamed "Federalists."

"On the 18th of March," wrote the Bakunist Arthur Arnould, a member of the Commune (*Popular History of the Commune*, page 243), "the people declared that it was necessary to get out of the vicious circle, that it was necessary to destroy the evil in the egg, that the thing to do was not merely to change masters, but no longer to have any. In a miraculous recognition of the truth, seeking to reach the goal by all the roads leading to it, the people proclaimed the autonomy of the Commune and a federation of communes.

"... For the first time, we were to interpret the real rules, the just and normal laws that assure the real independence of the individual and the group, communal or corporative, and to effect a tie between the various homogeneous groupings, so that they might enjoy, at the same time, union, in which there is strength, ... and autonomy, which is indispensable to ... the infinite development of all the original capacities and qualities of production and process."

This communal federalism appeared to the Anarcho-Proudhonians to be the organization in which the economic relation of the producers would find their *direct* expression.

"Each autonomous grouping," continues Arnould, "communal or corporative, depending on circumstances, will have to solve, within it, the social question, that is, the problems of property, the relation between labor and capital, etc."

Note the restriction: "communal or corporative, depending on circumstances." The viewpoint of the Federalist-Communist approaches quite closely to the outlook which, in 1833, led Morrisson and Smith to their formula of a "House of Trades;" which at the beginning of the twentieth century, gave rise to the doctrine of Georges Sorel, Edmond Berth, De Leon and others, on the replacement of the "artificial" subdivisions existing in the modern State by a federation of "natural" corporative (occupational) cells; and which, in 1917-1919, created the conception of the "Soviet system."

"Communal groupings," comments Arnould later, "correspond to the ancient political organization. The corporative grouping corresponds to the *social* organization." (Underlined by us.) Thus the communal organization was to serve as a *transition* between the State and the "corporative" federation.

This opposition of a "political" organization to a "social" organization presumes that the "destruction of the State machinery" by the proletariat will immediately reestablish among the producers the "natural" relations, which supposedly can only manifest themselves outside of political norms and institutions. This contrast underlay the social-revolutionary tendencies that were in favor among the Communards.

"Everything that the socialists stand for, and which they will not be able to get from a strong and centralized power, no matter how democratic, without formidable convulsions, without a ruinous, painful and cruel struggle—they will obtain in an orderly manner, with certainty, and without violence, through the simple working out of the communal principle of free grouping and federation."

"The solution of these problems can belong only to the corporative and productive groupings, united by federative ties, and therefore free from governmental and administrative—in other words, *political* (underlined by us)—shackles, which till now have maintained, by oppression, the antagonism between capital and labor, subjecting the latter to the first." *Ibidem*, page 250 of Russian translation.)

That is how, *the most advanced* of the Communards — the combatants who were closest to the social and revolutionary class movement of the French proletariat of the time—conceived the substance and scope of the Commune of 1871.

Charles Seignobos is obviously wrong when he states (in his note on the Commune, found in the *History of the 20th Century* by Lavis and Rambaud) that the revolutionaries renounced their initial aim—the seizure of power in France—and rallied to the cause of the autonomous commune of Paris, because they found themselves isolated from the rest of France and had to pass to the defensive. The latter circumstance merely helped the triumph of the Anarcho-Federalist ideas in the development of the Commune. If in the programs of the Communards, the "Hébertist" conception of the Commune as the dictator of France ceded ground to the Proudhonian idea of an apolitical federation, it is because the class character of the struggle between Paris and Versailles came out in the open. At that time, the class consciousness of the proletarians in the small industries of Paris gravitated entirely around the ideological opposition of a "natural" union of producers within society to the "artificial" unification of the producers within the State. We have seen how at the beginning, Varlin presented the Commune as a thing of pure democratic radicalism. In its proclamation of March 23, 1871, the Paris section of the International declared that—

"The independence of the Commune is the guarantee of a contract, the freely debated clauses of which will do away with class antagonism and assure social equality." This means the following: after the State and the power of constraint exercised by the State had collapsed, it becomes possible to create a simple "natural" social bond among the members of society—a bond based on their economic interdependence. And it is precisely the commune that is destined to become the framework within the limits of which this bond can be realized.

"We have demanded the emancipation of the workers," continues the proclamation, "and the communal delegation is the guarantee of this emancipation. For it will provide every citizen with the means of defending his rights, of controlling effectively the acts of the mandatories charged with the administration of his interests, and of determining the progressive application of social reforms."

It can be immediately seen that for the Anarchist idea of the *commune of labor*—that is, a union of producers, as contrasted

to a union of citizens within the State—the proclamation discreetly substitutes the idea of a *political* commune, the prototype of the modern State, a State microcosm, inside of which the representation of interests and the satisfaction of social needs become specialized functions, just as (though certainly in a more rudimentary form) in the complicated mechanism of the modern State. P. Lavrov understood this quite well when he wrote in his book on the Commune (P. Lavrov: *The Paris Commune*, p. 130, Russ. ed.):

"In the course of the 19th century, the unity of communal interests disappeared entirely before the increased struggle of classes. As a moral entity, the commune *did not exist at all* (underlined by Lavrov). In each commune (municipality) the irreducible camps of the proletariat and the big bourgeoisie faced each other, and the struggle was further complicated by the presence of many groups of the small bourgeoisie. For a moment, Paris was united by a common *emotion*: irritation with the Bordeaux and Versailles Assemblies. But a passing emotion cannot be the basis of a political regime."

Lavrov also says (p. 167):

"The effective autonomous basis of the regime, to which the social revolution will lead, is not at all the political commune, which admits inequality, the promiscuity of the parasites and laborers, etc. It is formed rather by a *conjointly responsible* grouping of workers of every kind, rallied to the program of the *social revolution*" (underlined by us).

P. Lavrov speaks clearly of a "confusion of two notions: 1. the autonomous political commune (municipality), the ideal of the Middle Ages, in the struggle for which the bourgeoisie solidified itself and grew strong during the first stages of its history; and 2. the autonomous commune of the proletariat, which is to appear after the economic victory of the proletariat over its enemies, after the establishment, *within* the community, of a social solidarity that is inconceivable as long as the economic exploitation of labor by capital continues, and, therefore, as long as class hatred within each community is inevitable. When we analyze the demands of communal autonomy, as they were generally formulated in the course of the struggle in question, one may ask: "What relation could the unquestionable socialists of the Paris Commune see between the fundamental problem of socialism—the struggle of labor against capital—and the slogan of the 'free commune' they inscribed on their flag?"

The paradox indicated by Lavrov consists of the following:

The very possibility of the process of transforming the capitalist order into a socialist order is subordinated to the existence of a social form whose mould, we believe can only be furnished by

a more or less developed socialist economy. This confusion is typical of the Anarchists. If it is obvious that the destruction of the basis of private economy, the transformation of the whole natural economy into socialist economy, will do away with the need of having an organization rise above the producers, in the shape of the State—the Anarchists deduce from this that "the destruction of the State, its "decomposition" into cells, into "communes," is a *prerequisite condition* for the social transformation itself. There existed in the ideology of the Communards a juxtaposition of Proudhonian, Hebertist and bourgeois-autonomist notions. So that in their discussions, they passed with the greatest of ease from the political "commune"—a territorial unit created by the preceding evolution of bourgeois society—to the "corporate" commune—the free association of workers, which we may imagine will be the social grouping when a socialist order is achieved and the collective effort of one or two generations will have rendered possible "the progressive atrophy of the State" predicted by Engels.⁴

The interesting exposition made Dunoyer, one of the witnesses appearing before the inquest commission named by the Versailles National Assembly after the crushing of the Commune (quoted by Lavrov in his *Paris Commune*, page 166), suggests the following conclusion:

The "communalist" ideas, as they were concretized in the minds of the workers, merely represented an attempt to transplant into the structure of society the forms of *their own* combat organization.

"In 1871, the grouping of the workers within the International by sections and federations of sections was one of the elements that contributed toward the spread of the commune idea in France." The International "possessed a ready made organization, where the word 'Commune' stood for the word 'Section' and the federation of communes was nothing else than the federation of sections."

Compare this statement with the citations that we took, in the preceding chapter, from the writings of the English trade-unionists of 1830, whose programs called for the replacement of the parliamentary bourgeois State with a "Federation of Trades." Let us recall the analogous theses of the French syndicalists in the 20th century. And let us not forget that in our time, working people take to "the idea of the soviets" after knowing them as combat organizations formed in the process of the class struggle at a sharp revolutionary stage.

In all the "commune" theses we discover a recurring point, consisting in spurning the "State" as the instrument of the revolutionary transformation of society in the direction of socialism. On the other hand, Marxism, as it developed since 1848, is characterized especially by the following:

Following the tradition of Babeuf and Blanqui, it recognizes the State (naturally after its conquest by the proletariat) as the principal lever of this transformation. That is why already in the 60's the Anarchists and Proudhonians denounced Marx and Engels as "Statists."

What then was the attitude of Marx and Engels in face of the experience provided by the Paris Commune, when the proletariat tried for the first time to realize its socialist dictatorship?

⁴We find today (1918-1919 among the Bolsheviks in Russia, and in Western Europe, the same confusion, with their specific political form" destined to accomplish the social emancipation of the proletariat. Also for these people the question is said to be that of replacing the territorial organization of the State with unions of producers. And at first that was described to be the essence of the republic of soviets. This substitution is presented to us, at the same time, as the natural result of the functioning of an achieved socialist régime and as the prerequisite condition necessary for the realization of the social revolution itself. The confusion just overflows all limits when an attempt is made to remedy it by resorting to the new notion of a "Soviet State." The latter is supposed to incarnate the organized violence of the proletariat and, in that capacity, prepare the ground for the "withering away" of all forms of the State. But at the same time, it is, in principle, supposedly opposed to the State as such. The Paris Communards reasoned the same way. They permitted themselves to imagine that the Commune-State of 1871 was something whose very principle was the opposite of any form of the State, while, in reality, it represented a simplified modern democratic State functioning in the manner of the Swiss canton.

(The next essay, *Marxism and the State*, will appear in the following issue of the *International Review*. This is the first and only translation of Martov's writings on *State and Socialist Revolution*. The preceding essays may be obtained at International Review, P. O. Box 44, Sta. O, New York City.)

CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM

• Jonathan Ayres

Previous installments appeared in the issues of no. 8, vol. 1; and nos. 1, 3, 5, 7 of vol. 2.

SINCE A COMMODITY becomes the complete use-value (useful thing) that it is intended to be only in the place and at the time it is consumed (sold), the activities of transportation, storage, wrapping, assorting which are engaged in by commercial enterprises, are a part of the value-producing process. Otherwise, the commercial activity of capitalism (as noted above) produces no new use-value. It merely changes use-value already created in the value-producing process from their commodity (product) form to a money form and from their money form to a commodity form. In view of this, commercial profit—excepting for the surplus value produced by the workers in transportation, storage and similar use-value creating transformations—is only a part of the surplus value that has been produced in the industrial (productive) process but has not yet been realized in the price charged and pocketed by the industrial entrepreneurs.

Only that can therefore be the source of the wages paid by mercantile enterprises to their clerks, salespeople, publicity staffs, bookkeepers, etc. The same applies, of course, to the wages or salaries of the office staffs of the industrial enterprises.

The wages and salaries of the various non-productive workers employed by capitalism in its circulation process, in the process of converting use-values from one form to another, are just that—expenses of circulation and not of production. "The capital invested in those expenses (including the labor employed by it) belongs to the dead expense of capitalist production. They must be made up out of the surplus product and are, from the point of view of the entire capitalist class, a deduction from the surplus or surplus product, just as the labor required for the purchase of the necessities of life is lost time for the laborer." (Page 169, vol. III, *Capital*.)¹

The wages of such workers, engaged in the process of circulation, are not necessarily in proportion to the mass of profits they help their employers to realize. "What the non-productive (commercial and office) worker costs to the capitalist and what he makes for him are two different things." "He adds to the income of the capitalist not by creating any direct surplus value but by helping to reduce the cost of realizing surplus value. In so doing he performs partly unpaid labor."

Both the industrial and commercial entrepreneurs borrow money to invest in their business: the first, in production, for the purchase of material means of production and labor power; the second, for fixtures and the help hired to enable the entrepreneurs (and investors) to get as big a cut of the surplus as

possible. (And, of course, the State borrows money in the form of bond issues.) Out of their profits (or "revenue," in the case of the borrowing State that does not assume the functions of the industrial and commercial entrepreneur, as the Soviet and Turkish States), the industrial and commercial enterprises pay back the money borrowed at varying rates of "interest."

Interest is a special term for a certain part of the surplus value which capital in process of its function has to give up to its owner. The money borrowed cannot create the interest paid to the lender. If it were so, its owner would not lend it.

What we have here—from the angle of the capitalist process as a whole—is this: a certain portion of the total social capital is available to all capitalists as a reserve (unemployed) means of purchase and payment. This is the portion of the total social capital that is the basis for the widespread credit and loan arrangement of capitalism.

The purely technical labor of paying and receiving money and lending money—essential for an economic arrangement in which money is invested in enterprises producing things for sale and selling things—has become the function of a special set of capitalists, the bankers, who perform these services for all the rest of the capitalist class.

The banks centralize money capital. They get money in their capacity as cashiers of industrial and commercial capitalists; from deposits of money capitalists, who do their business of loaning out money through the banks; from deposits of money savings and temporarily unemployed money of all classes; from deposits of revenue that is being gradually consumed, taken out of the banks where it is deposited.

(The modern banking enterprise is also heavily interested in productive, commercial and land ventures, just as the investors and directors of many industrial and commercial enterprises are interested in "finance." It is idle, in modern capitalism, to seek differences between industrial, finance and commercial capitals and capitalists.)

It is not hard to recognize that the "purely technical labor of paying and receiving money" does not produce use-values. The profits of the banking enterprise are merely slices of the profits of the industrial and commercial entrepreneurs. And the wages of the banking employees who actually perform the described service belong, like the wages of all non-productive workers, to the expenses of circulation.

What the masters of enterprise have left after paying, out of the total profit, the interest on the money borrowed from other possessors of money, and after paying to themselves the interest on the money they themselves supplied, is their *profits of enterprise*, the profit they make in their capacity as masters of the enterprise, in other words, the part of the surplus value they keep as a "recompense" for their labor of exploitation.

Considered from the angle of its social role, capital is property that while possessed by one person commands the labor of another person. Interest is an expression of the mere ownership of capital as a means of appropriating the product of the labor of the non-possessing person. On the surface, it appears to be a relation between two capitalists only, and not a relation between the capitalist and the wage worker. Profits of enterprise, on the other hand, appear to be a recompense for a certain kind of labor, the labor of supervising the labor of the laborer.

(Continued in the following issue)

¹But notice an important difference between some of these non-productive functions, say between bookkeeping and mere selling and buying: "The latter arise only from the definite social form of the process of production. They are due to the fact that it is a production of commodities. Bookkeeping, for the control and ideal survey of the process, becomes necessary to the extent that the process assumes a social scale and loses its purely individual character. It is, therefore, more necessary in capitalist production than in scattered handicraft and agricultural production, and still more necessary in co-operative (socialist) production than in capitalist production." (Vol. II, page 153.)

SOURCES OF BOLSHEVISM

• Sprenger

Chapter II

(First readers are asked to turn to the September issue of the International Review, which contains the first installment of this unpublished study of the Russian labor movement.)

IN SO FAR as they were composed of intellectuals, the Russian Social-democrats did not differ from the old Narodniki or the Social-revolutionaries. But in view of the bitter opposition that existed between the Social democrats and the Social revolutionaries, neither of these trends can be talked of as a direct extension of the older revolutionary movement of the Russian intelligentsia.

The Social-revolutionaries could say about themselves that they had taken over the methods of struggle, the conceptions of development and the peasant perspective of the populists (the Narodniki). The Social-democrats, on the other hand, fought against the Narodniki; and the Bolsheviki felt that they were the guardians and renovators of the original Marxist theory. They referred to their own ideology as the finally perfected and developed form of Marxism. They styled themselves as the only genuine spiritual heirs of Marx and Engels.

If these claims had been well grounded, the Bolshevik Party was the direct and sole continuator of the political and theoretic movement that had its starting point in the work of the two founders of scientific socialism. Could Bolshevism really lay claim to this role?

The question has a great international significance for the struggling workers of the world. It can only be answered by making clear another query. To what extent was the social character of Bolshevism determined by its origin in the revolutionary intelligentsia of Russia? Was Bolshevism the continuation of the international Marxist movement of the working class, or was it merely the continuation of a national Russian movement of the revolutionary intellectuals of that country?

Bolshevism will contest the right to such a question. It will point to its Marxist orthodoxy. But the social significance of a revolutionary movement does not depend merely on its ideology. It depends on the social content that hides behind this ideology. The essential marks of Bolshevism are not its Marxist formulae. The essential marks of Bolshevism are the social facts found behind and near its principles and the policies springing from those social facts. Only if the principles and the given social facts agree, can the Bolshevik claim to a position at the peak of the development of Marxism be justified.

The Growth of the Russian Proletariat

The old Narodniki movement ended in a blind alley. Its terrorist wing, the Narodnaia Volia, was destroyed without succeeding in releasing a peasant revolt. Then its propagandist wing, the Cherny Peredel, appeared on the scene, and experienced the bankruptcy of its program of "going to the people." The peasants were unaffected by its propaganda. As a result, a section of the populist intelligentsia began to revise their tactics.

The Russian revolutionists knew that as intellectuals they could not themselves start and carry through a revolution. They felt themselves to be no more than the predestined guides and inspirers of a revolt, in which they would have the function of

expressing the aim of the struggle and occupying the positions of command. They considered themselves to be the general staff of the Russian revolution, the regiments of which would be composed of the broad popular masses. By "going to the people," they wanted to enlist and organize these regiments.

This outlook had already been developed in great detail by Bakunin, whose disciples helped to form the first ranks of the Narodnik movement. Bakunin did not consider it necessary to educate the people for revolution. He thought it was merely necessary to "stir up" the peasant masses to win them over to a revolutionary offensive. Up to then, the same masses had rebelled badly and fruitlessly. It was necessary, said Bakunin, to bring order, plan, organization to the otherwise disorganized rebellion. This was the task of "devoted, energetic, intellectual personalities," who had to be "genuine friends of the people" and "individuals with the devil in them." By their boldness, these persons were to lead the people in action and serve as "intermediaries between the revolutionary idea and the people." These, as it were, born revolutionists "were not going to form the army of the revolution. The people itself must form the revolutionary army. The revolutionary intellectuals would construct a sort of general staff." The "commanding staff" of the revolution would emerge from the "educated world of the bold youth," that is, from among the daring students. Under this staff, Bakunin wanted to organize the masses. "The laboring people are numerous. But the mass means nothing if it is not organized," he wrote.

In 1869, the Bakuninists, under the leadership of Nechaiev, drafted a general and very definite plan for an uprising. First, circles of revolutionary students were to be built, to create an officers' corps. Then the revolutionists were going to turn to the "have-nots" of Russian society, to the declassed elements of the cities and provincial towns, and send them, in the capacity of "propagandists of the deed," into the villages. The expectation was that early in 1870 a general mass revolt would break forth, bringing destruction to Tsarism and liberty to the people.

By the "people," the Bakuninists and the Narodniki meant the peasants. They saw no other army for their revolution. Already in 1851, Herzen prophesied: "Should autocracy triumph over civilization, a peasant revolt, a colossal insurrection, would unroll before its eyes." And he explained that in Russia the muzhik would be the personage of the future, just as in France the worker.

He thus gave expression to the basic dogma of the Narodnik kind of socialism. "In Russia, there is no capitalist development. Therefore, the Russian socialist movement must spring directly from the peasantry, which is uninfluenced either by the high development or decomposition of Western civilization."

The Social-democratic intellectuals drew new conclusions from the reliance of the Narodniki on a typically Russian "revolutionary army." The Narodniki saw only the peasants and exhausted themselves in fruitless attempts to revolutionize them. In the end, they found themselves alone. The passivity of the peasant masses seemed unconquerable. Yet the result of the terrorists' duel with Tsarism proved that a struggle limited to a handful of intellectuals was impossible. The intelligentsia could lead a revolution, but could not make it. If their revolution did not find support in the peasantry, the intellectuals had to turn perforce to the workers, who then began to bestir themselves in strike activity.

The Social-democratic intellectuals caught sight of the growing contingent of Russian workers, who were up to then struggling independently. The Social-democratic intellectuals started to

make efforts to win a mass following for themselves in the new field. Axelrod wrote in the *Iskra* of 1903:

"In order to arouse the masses out of their historic sleep, in order to lead them into the political arena, it was necessary to encourage in the masses a systematically revolutionary outlook and activity. It was especially necessary to encourage their understanding of their own difficult condition and the causes for it. The solution of this historic task was attempted in its way by the 'Narodnik' movement in the 70's of the past century. That movement did not, however, succeed in solving this task for the reason that it could not recognize the historic significance of the class of industrial workers, a class that was entirely new for the Russia of that day. Only Marxism could find the key. Only Marxism could show the means and the way to the solution of the basic, generally democratic, problems of the Russian revolutionary movement. Here lies the root of the strength of our party, the reason for its final victory over all other revolutionary fractions and its present unshakable position."

(Continued in the following issue)

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